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In three experiments we tested how the spacing of trials during acquisition of zero, positive, and nega-
tive event–outcome contingencies differentially affected depressed and nondepressed students’ judge-
ments. Experiment 1 found that nondepressed participants’ judgements of zero contingencies
increased with longer intertrial intervals (ITIs) but not simply longer procedure durations.
Depressed groups’ judgements were not sensitive to either manipulation, producing an effect
known as depressive realism only with long ITIs. Experiments 2 and 3 tested predictions of
Cheng’s (1997) Power PC theory and the Rescorla–Wagner (1972) model, that the increase in
context exposure experienced during the ITI might influence judgements most with negative contin-
gencies and least with positive contingencies. Results suggested that depressed people were less
sensitive to differences in contingency and contextual exposure. Together we propose that a
context-processing difference between depressed and nondepressed people removes any objective
notion of “realism” that was originally employed to explain the depressive realism effect (Alloy &
Abramson, 1979).
Learning that behaviour can cause things to occur
is a basic requirement to being able to interact
adaptively with the environment. In addition to
the obvious evidence that people are quite good at
learning to control their environments, there is
also interesting data that show that people make
quite accurate judgements about their degree of
control over outcomes (e.g., Wasserman,
Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983; Wasserman, Elek,
Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993). One experimental pro-
cedure, used to investigate the psychological mech-
anisms underlying such learning, involves using
discrete trials during which subjects are encouraged
to test whether a given response, such as a computer
PQJE200155 TECHSET COMPOSITION LTD, SALISBURY, U.K. 11/13/2006
Correspondence should be addressed to Rachel M. Msetfi, School of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Herts.
AL10 9AB, UK or Robin A. Murphy, Department of Psychology, Gower Street, University College, London WC1E 6BT, UK.
E-mail: Q1
We thank Esnath Sibanda and Louise Neville for collecting data for Experiment 1. The data from Experiments 2 and 3 formed
part of the first author’s PhD dissertation.
# 0000 The Experimental Psychology Society 1
http://www.psypress.com/qjep DOI:10.1080/17470210601002595
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
0000, 00 (0), 1–21
key press, does or does not cause an outcome, such
as a light flash, to occur (e.g., Alloy & Abramson,
1979). The outcome can be programmed by the
experimenter to be contingent or noncontingent
upon the participant’s response. When asked to
judge their degree of control over the outcome’s
occurrence, people generally tend to make judge-
ments that are consistent with the relationship
that they are asked to judge (Allan & Jenkins,
1980; Vallee-Tourangeau, Hollingsworth, &
Murphy, 1998a; Wasserman et al., 1993).
However, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found
that people’s mood might alter their perceptions
of response–outcome contingencies. They asked
nondepressed and depressed students to judge
their degree of control over an outcome in two
conditions that were both programmed to be non-
contingent but differed in the frequency of
outcome occurrence. According to Alloy and
Abramson, accurate participants should have
learnt that there was no relationship between
their responses and the outcome in both con-
ditions. They found, however, that when out-
comes occurred frequently, nondepressed people
seemed to think that they had more control over
the outcome occurrence then when it occurred
less frequently. Depressed participants, on the
other hand, perceived that their behaviour had
the same control over the occurrence of the
outcome in both conditions. According to Alloy
and Abramson the depressed participants did not
show an illusion of control while the nondepressed
did. On the basis of these findings, Alloy and
Abramson suggested that depression increased
accuracy in the perception of noncontingent
relationships. Of course one simple explanation
may have been that the nondepressed used the jud-
gement scale in a different way to reflect frequency
rather than contingency; however, other more
complex explanations were proposed.
One theoretical account of this apparent ten-
dency towards accuracy explains depressive judge-
ments in terms of pessimistic but accurate
expectations. In other words, if depressed people,
who might expect to have little or no control
over their environment, are presented with a situ-
ation congruent with these expectations, their
judgements will appear to be accurate (e.g., Alloy
& Tabachnik, 1984). An alternative interpretation
of the depressive realism literature, based on a psy-
chophysical analysis of contingency data, questions
whether verbal ratings actually assess sensitivity to
the presented contingency (see Allan, Siegel, &
Hannah, 2007). However, whether any partici-
pant’s judgement reflects absolute accuracy
assumes that the experimenter is in a privileged
position to objectively measure the contingency.
We have suggested that knowing the exact con-
tingency to which a participant is exposed is extre-
mely difficult (see Murphy, Vallee Tourangeau,
Msetfi, & Baker, 2005). For instance, we
have found that one particular experimental vari-
able that might not normally be considered by
the experimenter to be relevant to participants’
judgements—the length of the intertrial interval
(ITI)—has a particular influence on judgements
(Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005).
These findings are described in greater detail
below but, briefly, we found that the so-called illu-
sion of control with nondepressed is only present in
conditions with long intervals between the experi-
mental trials. The theoretical analysis of this
effect, which we presented, suggested that the inter-
trial interval might be being integrated into the per-
ception of contingency. Doing this might radically
alter a participant’s perception of the programmed
contingency. For instance, conditions that are
apparently noncontingent from the perspective of
the experimenter might be correctly perceived
as contingent by the participant. This difference is
important for understanding depressive cognition.
Indeed the notion of depressive realism (DR)
depends upon the assumption that nondepressed
people’s judgements reflect inaccuracy. In order to
illustrate how nondepressed people’s apparently
optimistic contingency estimates might actually be
accurate, the discussion below describes contin-
gency events and shows how the integration of
ITIs changes the contingency calculation.
Figure 1 (upper panel) shows how to categorize
the four different types of experience that can be
used to determine whether any event (in this
case the response) and outcome are noncontingent
(i.e., independent) or contingent (i.e., related).
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The frequency of pairing the response with the
outcome (cell A), or the frequency of the response
without the outcome (cell B), together define how
likely it is that the response will be followed by an
outcome. Similarly, the frequency of the outcome
by itself (cell C) or the frequency of neither the
response nor the outcome (cell D) defines how
likely the outcome is to occur in the absence of
the response. One frequently used normative
measure of the overall relationship, against which
to evaluate the accuracy of judgements, is Dp
(Allan, 1980). Dp is simply the difference
between the probability of the outcome given the
response, P(OjR), and the probability of the
outcome given no response, P(OjNoR). Dp
varies continuously between þ 1, indicating a
perfect positive relationship, through zero, indi-
cating no relationship, to 2 1, indicating a per-
fectly negative relationship. A positive value of
Dp indicates that the response is related to an
increase in the likelihood of the occurrence of
the outcome, whereas a negative value of Dp
indicates that the presence of the response
decreases the likelihood of the outcome occurring.
Figure 1. Contingency tables showing (top panel) the four possible combinations of response–outcome information and the generic
information from which Dp is calculated, where A, B, C, and D refer to the frequencies of such information. Dp ¼ A/(A þ B) – C/
(C þ D). The middle panel shows high-density positive, zero, and negative contingencies and the Dp and causal power calculation for
each condition. The lower panel shows the effect of adding 40 ITIs, as cell D events, to the Dp and causal power calculations. Note that
P(OjR) refers to the conditional probability of the outcome given the presence of the response, and P(OjNoR) refers to the conditional
probability of the outcome given the absence of the response. Q2
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If judgements are based on a cognitive process that
mirrors this relationship, as some have proposed
(Cheng, 1997), then one might conclude that jud-
gements were accurate. However, the finding that
judgements sometimes deviate from this, or other
normative measures, has controversially been used
to support the idea that people are not accurate
(e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Dickinson,
Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Smedslund, 1963).
The problem for any claim of an assessment of
accuracy is that it assumes that the experimenter
can easily identify all the event information that
the participant will recruit for their judgement.
During a discrete trial training procedure, partici-
pants experience trials during which they are
encouraged to either perform a response (cells A
and B) or withhold responding (cells C and D),
thereby providing them with the only relevant
data with which to form their judgements. The
intertrial intervals in these tasks are simply empty
periods during which the participants wait for
the next opportunity to learn. However, the inter-
trial interval, like all experience, could be con-
sidered as one of the four relevant event
conjunctions that represent the information rel-
evant for judging response–outcome contingency
(cell D: See also Baker, Murphy, Vallee-
Tourangeau, & Mehta, 2001).
In previous work we showed that the length of
the ITI does influence participants’ perceptions of
contingency (Msetfi et al., 2005; Murphy et al.,
2005). Both nondepressed and depressed partici-
pants were exposed to the zero-contingency con-
dition, shown in Figure 1, with either short (3-s)
or long (15-s) intertrial intervals. Nondepressed
people’s judgements were significantly more posi-
tive in the long than in the short intertrial interval
conditions. Moreover, like Alloy and Abramson
(1979) this effect was present in high outcome fre-
quency (see Figure 1: Dp ¼ .75 2.75 ¼ 0) but not
low outcome frequency zero contingencies (Dp ¼
.25 2.25 ¼ 0). This is exactly the result that one
might predict if the intertrial intervals were
being perceived as evidence—that when partici-
pants do not perform the response, no outcome
occurs (cell D event). It follows that if ITIs are
included in a contingency calculation as cell D
events, then a zero contingency relationship,
which might be programmed during the discrete
trials by the experimenter, might actually be per-
ceived as a positive contingency by the participant.
Figure 1 (middle column, middle panel) shows the
traditional calculation of Dp for a 40-trial zero
contingency. A 40-trial procedure also includes
40 ITI periods and the impact of including 40
ITIs into the contingency calculation as cell D
events is also displayed (middle column, lower
panel) and results in an increase in Dp. This
increase occurs because in each case extra cell D
events only influence one of the two conditional
probabilities that describe Dp. They decrease
P(OjNoR), while having no impact on the
P(OjR), and furthermore this influence should
be less dramatic in a low outcome frequency zero
contingency. The inclusion of 40 ITIs as cell D
events is, of course, purely arbitrary as it is
unknown whether one ITI is perceived as more
than or less than one cell D event. However, any
additional cell D events included in the contin-
gency calculation will have the effect of reducing
the P(OjNoR) in the manner described above.
There are at least two possible reasons why
nondepressed people’s judgements of a zero con-
tingency increased with longer intertrial intervals.
The first is related to potential changes to the pre-
dictive value of the absence of responding.
Lengthening the ITI may increase the perception
that, in the absence of any responding, the other
experimental cues (the context) fail to elicit the
outcome, in spite of the fact that participants
have no opportunity to respond during the ITI.
The second source of the effect may lie with the
difference in the session lengths between short
and long ITI conditions. It is possible that the
change in judgements reflects greater confidence
that might emerge with the longer training follow-
ing longer ITIs or perhaps some effect due to
general habituation to the experimental setting.
EXPERIMENT 1
In the first experiment reported here, to rule out an
explanation of the effect based on simple exposure,
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we manipulated both the ITI length and session
length to test which of the two factors results in
the increased judgements of zero contingencies.
The design involved crossing two levels of ITI
length (3 s, 15 s) with two levels of training
length (320 s, 800 s), which consequently required
varying the number of trials experienced by the
four groups. If ITI length is the crucial variable,
then both groups of control participants trained
with the long ITI should show higher judgements
of the zero contingencies, regardless of session
length or number of trials. Depressed participants
should show no sensitivity to the change in ITI
length, and their judgements might be expected
to be generally lower than nondepressed partici-
pants’ judgements.
However, a further variable, which might
potentially contribute to the effects we are discuss-
ing, is the number of responses that participants
perform during the procedure. For example, con-
sider the case of a zero-contingency condition,
where the P(OjR) and P(OjNoR) are pro-
grammed to be .75. If the participant did not
evenly distribute responding, then it is possible
that the programmed contingency might drift
from the nominal value programmed. In the
extreme case, if the participant responded on
every trial then they would have no information
about withholding responses, and this might lead
them to experience a positive contingency with
the P(OjR) . P(OjNoR) and consequently
higher judgements. Indeed, Matute (1996)
showed how higher rates of responding were
linked to higher judgements, although this ten-
dency was observed only in conditions where par-
ticipants were not explicitly instructed to sample
response and no-response trials equally. Given
that such fluctuations in P(R) could produce
long ITI depressive realism effects, in the present




University students received course credit for their
participation and were assigned to the
nondepressed control (n ¼ 36) and depressed
groups (n ¼ 39) on the basis of their scores on
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck,
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). In
all three experiments reported here, scores of 8
or below indicated no depression, and scores of 9
or above indicated mild depression. The depressed
group produced significantly higher BDI scores
(M ¼ 14.10, SE ¼ 0.79) than did the nonde-
pressed group (M ¼ 3.78, SE ¼ 0.41), t(56.342)
¼ 11.578, p , .001, two-tailed, equal variances
not assumed. Of the nondepressed participants,
19 were female, and 17 were male. Of the
depressed participants, 25 were female, and 14
were male. The distribution of males and females
did not differ across the nondepressed and
depressed groups, x2(1) ¼ 0.990, p ¼ .320.
Participants were pseudorandomly assigned to
the four experimental conditions, and the resulting
sample sizes are shown in Table 1.
Design
In this experiment, we used a 2 (ITI length: short,
3 s; long, 15 s)  2 (overall procedure time: short,
320 s; long, 800 s)  2 (mood: nondepressed,
depressed) fully factorial between-subjects
design. Unlike our previous experiments in
which all treatments received the same number
(40) of trials, in this experiment the number of
trials was a function of the combination of ITI
length and procedure time. The short ITI length
and short procedure time group received 40 trials
as before, but the short ITI length group with
the long procedure received 100 trials. In the two





procedure timea Non depressed Depressed
3 320 10 8
15 800 9 9
3 800 7 10
15 320 10 12
Note: ITI ¼ intertrial interval.
aIn s.
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long ITI treatments, the number of trials was 16
and 40 for the short and long procedure times,
respectively. A computerized version of the con-
tingency judgement task used by Alloy and
Abramson (1979) was used to obtain judgements
of control (for full details see Msetfi et al., 2005).
The task was a high-density zero-contingency
condition (shown in Figure 1), where the
P(lightjresponse) was .75, and the P(lightjno
response) was also .75. This contingency was
chosen as it is the one in which both Alloy and
Abramson and Msetfi et al. found reliable differ-
ences between the depressed and control groups.
The total numbers of trials, cell frequencies, and
Dp for each experimental condition are shown in
Table 1. Participants judged their control over
light onset on a scale that varied from 0 to 100,
where 0 ¼ no control and 100 ¼ total control.
Intermediate values represented varying degrees
of partial control.
Apparatus
The presentation of experimental events was pro-
grammed using REALbasic (Version 3) software.
Procedure
Participants were briefed verbally and in writing as
to the nature of the task requirements and then
completed the BDI. Task instructions, displayed
on the computer screen, explained how partici-
pants were to judge how much control their press-
ing of a button had over a light switching on and
informed them about the necessity of pressing
the button on some trials but not on others on
an approximately equal number of occasions (see
Appendix A). At the beginning of the session, a
light bulb graphic in its “off state” appeared on
the screen. Each trial was constructed so that
there was a 3-s opportunity for the participant to
press the button using the space bar on the compu-
ter keyboard. This period was signalled by an on-
screen message saying, “You may press the button
now!” This was followed by a 2-s period, on both
response and no response trials, where the light
bulb graphic either switched to the “on state” or
remained in the “off state”. Each trial was separ-
ated by an ITI period (3 s or 15 s) where the
light bulb graphic in its “off state” remained on
the screen. The probability of the light switching
on both after a response and after no response
was .75. Judgements of control were made after
all experimental trials were completed.
Participants were then debriefed.
Results and discussion
Judgements of perceived control over light onset in
the high-density zero-contingency condition with
short and long ITIs and short and long procedure
times are shown in Figure 2. The data suggest that,
whereas the nondepressed groups’ judgements
increased with the longer ITI, this effect was not
influenced by the overall procedure time.
Depressed participants’ judgements, in contrast,
were not influenced by either factor.
The data were analysed using a fully factorial
analysis of variance, with ITI length (3 s, 15 s),
overall procedure time (320 s, 800 s), and mood
(nondepressed, depressed) as between-subjects
Figure 2. Judgements of control in a high-density zero-contingency
condition as a function of intertrial interval length, overall
procedure time, and mood from Experiment 1. Error bars
correspond to the standard error of the mean.
6 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 0000, 00 (0)
MSETFI, MURPHY, SIMPSON
factors. The alpha level was set at .05 unless stated
otherwise. The two-way interaction between ITI
length and mood was significant, F(1, 67) ¼
6.53, p ¼ .01, MSE ¼ 669.15, h2 ¼ .09. None
of the other main effects or interactions reached
the level of significance (all ps . .15, all h2 ,
.03). A simple effects analysis of the two-way
interaction showed that the nondepressed groups’
judgements were higher in the long ITI conditions
than in the short ITI conditions, F(1, 67) ¼ 7.72,
p ¼ .01, MSE ¼ 669.15, h2 ¼ .09. However, the
depressed groups judgements were not influenced
by ITI length (F , 1).
Response rates. The rate of responding for each par-
ticipant was converted to a probability of response
and was analysed using the same procedure as that
described above. The probability of response for
each experimental condition is shown in Table 2.
The analysis showed that the probability of
responding was generally higher for nondepressed
participants (M ¼ .595, SE ¼ .014) than for
depressed participants (M ¼ .543, SE ¼ .017),
F(1, 67) ¼ 5.06, p ¼ .028, MSE ¼ .008, h2 ¼
.07. Participants also made more responses when
the overall procedure time was short (M ¼ .602,
SE ¼ .014) than when it was long (M ¼ .529,
SE ¼ .016), F(1, 67) ¼ 11.776, p ¼ .001, MSE
¼ .008, h2 ¼ .15. None of the other main effects
or interactions were reliable (all ps . .545, all h2
, .006).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the
increased judgements observed with longer ITIs
are not a function of the increased session
length. It is also quite interesting that when ITI
length was constant but trials were manipulated
(in order to increase procedure time), there was
no effect of the number of trials. Previous studies
have reported trial effects on contingency judge-
ments (Dickinson et al., 1984; Shanks, 1985),
although these effects have been observed using a
continuous monitoring procedure (see Baker,
Berbrier, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1989, for a more
detailed discussion of why these effects may have
occurred).
Even though both mood and overall procedure
time were shown to influence the P(R), the
observed differences were not large enough to
produce fluctuations in the programmed contin-
gency. Moreover, ITI length alone, or in inter-
action with mood, did not produce differences in
the P(R). This result then, is consistent with the
conclusion that with long ITIs, nondepressed par-
ticipants perceive a stronger relation between
responding and the occurrence of the outcome.
EXPERIMENT 2
So far we have only studied the effect of ITIs on
putative zero contingency learning. The reason
for this is that previous studies had suggested
that nonzero contingencies do not elicit differ-
ences between depressed and nondepressed par-
ticipants (Alloy, Abramson, & Kossman, 1985;
Lennox, Bedell, Abramson, Raps, & Foley,
1990; Vasquez, 1987). Alloy and Abramson
suggested that nonzero contingencies might
match the expectations that drive judgements in
nondepressed participants, whereas zero contin-
gencies do not. This is because, in zero-contin-
gency conditions, nondepressed people’s
judgements reflect an optimistic bias because
they are more likely to expect to have control
over outcomes than they actually do (Ackermann
& DeRubeis, 1991; Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). In contrast depressed
people have unbiased expectations regardless of





procedure timea Nondepressed Depressed
3 320 .613 (.022) .588 (.034)
3 800 .544 (.023) .500 (.034)
15 320 .644 (.028) .568 (.027)
15 800 .561 (.026) .517 (.035)
Note: ITI ¼ intertrial interval. Standard errors of the mean are
shown in parentheses.
aIn s.
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contingency. Consistent with this prediction there
is no evidence, so far, that depressive realism
effects occur in nonzero-contingency conditions.
However, the possible role of the ITI that we
have described can also inform the issue of
whether nonzero contingencies might produce
mood differences. Positive contingencies are in
fact predicted to be less susceptible to ITI effects
than are zero contingencies. Furthermore the ITI
analysis suggests that the effects might be as
strong or stronger with negative contingencies.
According to our analysis, ITIs influence the
overall contingency because, if conceptualized as
extra cell D events, they reduce the probability of
the outcome in the absence of the response,
P(OjNoR). However, the effect is predicted to
be determined by the specific level of contingency.
Consider the high-density zero contingency dis-
played in Figure 1. If 40 ITIs are included as
extra cell D events, the P(OjNoR) decreases
from .75 to .25, with a corresponding increase in
Dp from 0 to .5. However, in a positive-contin-
gency condition (Figure 1, left column), where
the P(O/R) is 1.0, and the P(OjNoR) is .5, the
P(OjNoR) decreases from .5 to .17, with
the potential increase in Dp being from .5 to .83.
Therefore, with the same change in cell D, the
increase to the overall relationship is smaller for
positive contingencies. In contrast, a negative-
contingency condition, where the Dp is 2 .5
(Figure 1, right column) the change in contingency
is greatest, with the contingency going from–.5 to
.17. Therefore, changes to P(OjNoR) might be
expected to influence negative contingencies more
than zero and zero more than positive contingen-
cies. Therefore, what have hitherto been referred
to as depressive realism effects, but in our terms
the tendency for nondepressed participants to
produce judgements that varied from the normative
expectations of the experimenter, might be more
readily observable in negative and zero contingen-
cies than in positive-contingency conditions. This
might explain previous failures to find them in posi-
tive contingencies. It is worth noting that this
general pattern of changes requires choosing con-
tingencies that are matched on overall number of
trials.
The prediction stated above is shared by most
theories of contingency learning although for
different reasons. The Power PC model (Cheng,
1997), for example, assumes that judgements are
based on the intuitive notion of causal power.
Generative causal power can be calculated by
dividing DP by the denominator: 1 – P(OjNoR)
or in the case of preventative power simply by
P(OjNoR). Therefore any reduction in the
P(OjNoR), because of the inclusion of extra ITI
or D cell events, would result in an increase in
both the numerator and the denominator of the
equation, as well as the resulting causal power.
As in the analysis presented above, the ITI is
likely to have less effect on causal power in con-
ditions where the Dp is already positive (see
Figure 1).
The associative Rescorla–Wagner model
(RWM: Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) makes
similar predictions to Dp although for different
reasons. In associative language, two associations,
the response–outcome association and the
context–outcome association, compete for associ-
ative strength. The strength of the response–
outcome association increases to the extent that
the context–outcome association decreases or
extinguishes. One interpretation of the increased
judgements found with extra intertrial interval
experience is that the ITI serves to extinguish
the association between the contextual cues
and the outcome. However, the difference
between the two ITI conditions (short and long)
for positive contingencies is predicted to be
smaller than that for zero contingencies. Like the
Dp and Power PC models, this ITI effect would
be predicted to be less apparent in positive contin-
gencies. The aim of the next two experiments was
to extend the ITI analysis to conditions with
nonzero levels of contingency.
We made two changes to the previous pro-
cedure. One involved an attempt to measure the
contextual learning that might be taking place
during this task, and the other involved shortening
the length of the ITI in the short ITI conditions.
Previous studies of human contextual learning
(e.g., Vallee-Tourangeau, Murphy, Drew, &
Baker, 1998b) and animal contextual conditioning
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(Murphy & Baker, 2004), which have measured
contextual learning using a discrete constantly
present cue to represent the context, have found
evidence of the reciprocal learning between dis-
crete cues and contextual cues. Furthermore,
there is direct evidence that increasing the intervals
between trials improves learning about the target
stimulus (or response) relative to massing trials,
in both animals (Gibbon, Baldock, Locurto,
Gold, & Terrace, 1977; Holland, 2000) and
humans (Mercier & Parr, 1996). The following
experiment included a constantly present cue,
and we asked participants to judge the constant
cues. However, in order not to contaminate the
target cue ratings, context judgements were
always taken following judgements of the target.
In order to maximize the difference between
the short and long ITI conditions the length of
the short ITI in these experiments was reduced
from 3 to 0.5 seconds. A shorter ITI should be
expected to decrease contextual extinction and
therefore the context’s impact on judgements,
which might then be predicted to strengthen the




A total of 96 university students were recruited for
this experiment using a mass screening procedure
and were paid £5 for their participation. They
were required to fill in the BDI before being
invited to participate in the experiment. On
arrival, participants filled in the BDI again and
were assigned to the depressed and nondepressed
groups as described previously with the constraint
that there should be equal numbers of males and
females in each group. Experimental conditions
(n ¼ 12) were matched on age and years of edu-
cation, F(1, 88) ¼ 2.91, p ¼ .09, MSE ¼ 34.97,
and F(1, 88) ¼ 0.51, p ¼ .48, MSE ¼ 3.44,
respectively. As expected, depressed groups had
significantly higher BDI scores (M ¼ 16.94, SE
¼ 1.05) than nondepressed groups (M ¼ 3.27,
SE ¼ 0.38), F(1, 88) ¼ 150.99, p , .001,
MSE ¼ 29.69.
Design
The experiment utilized a 2 (contingency: zero,
positive)  2 (length of intertrial interval: short,
long)  2 (mood: nondepressed, depressed)  2
(sex: female, male) fully factorial between-subjects
design. Participants were exposed to either a high-
density zero (.75/.75) or positive (1.0/.5) contin-
gency condition. The ITI was either short (0.5 s)
or long (15 s), and participants were either
depressed or nondepressed. Participants made jud-
gements about their own control over the outcome
when making the response. They also made similar
judgements about a constantly present context cue,
an on-screen button that remained in the “on” pos-
ition throughout the experimental task.
Data analysis. The data were analysed using a multi-
variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with ITI
length (short, long), contingency (zero, positive),
mood (nondepressed, depressed), and sex (female,
male) as between-subjects factors with judgements
of the response and the context treated as two
dependent variables. The MANOVA analysis
allows one to determine whether the four factors
influence ratings of the response cue and the
context cue in the same manner and whether judge-
ments of zero and positive contingencies differ. As
sex had no reliable effects on judgements this
factor was excluded from further analyses.
Probability of response data was also analysed
using a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA)
including the same factors as those described above.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as that for
Experiment 1 except that there was a variation in
task instructions in order to accommodate the
introduction of the new context button.
Participants were asked to imagine a scenario in
which they were scientists testing a piece of exper-
imental apparatus (see Appendix B). Participants
were shown a picture of the apparatus, which com-
prised a small box containing a visible light bulb.
Mounted on the apparatus were two buttons—
“A” and “B”. Button B (the constantly present
context) was stuck in the “on” position and could
not be pressed. Button A was the only button
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that participants could press, using the space bar
on the keyboard, to assess the extent of their
control over light onset. Participants were informed
that they would make two judgements, the first
about their own control over light onset when
pressing Button A and the second about Button
B’s control over light onset. There was a 3-s
button-pressing opportunity signalled by an on-
screen message, “You may press the button now!”
This was followed by a 2-s period when the light
either switched on or remained off. Each trial was
separated by an intertrial interval that was 0.5 s
long in the short conditions and 15 s long in the
long conditions. After completing the 40
experimental trials, participants made their
judgements.
Results and discussion
Judgements were made about control over light
onset in zero- and positive-contingency conditions
with short and long ITIs and are shown in
Figure 3. Response judgements appeared to be
influenced by contingency and ITI length,
whereas context judgements were not.
These observations were examined using an
MANOVA. There were no reliable main effects
or interactions involving the context judgements.
Overall the level of contingency influenced
response judgements, with positive contingencies
judged to be higher than zero contingencies, F(1,
88) ¼ 14.70, p , .001, h2 ¼ .14, MSE ¼
689.16. The ITI length by mood interaction was
significant, F(1, 88) ¼ 13.13, p , .001, h2 ¼
.13, MSE ¼ 689.16, as was the main effect of
mood, F(1, 88) ¼ 12.35, p ¼ .001, h2 ¼ .12,
MSE ¼ 689.16. None of the other effects or inter-
actions involving response judgements reached the
level of significance. Although the three-way
interaction between contingency, mood, and ITI
length was not reliable, it was necessary to
conduct further comparisons involving the contin-
gency factor in order to assess hypotheses about
ITI effects being dependent on levels of contin-
gency. Therefore, seven further comparisons
were then carried out on the response data with
the alpha level adjusted to a conservative value of
.007 using the Bonferroni procedure.
There was no evidence that nondepressed
people’s judgements increased as a function of
ITI length in the positive-contingency condition,
F , 1. Although depressed people’s judgements
of the same condition appeared to be lower in
the long ITI condition, this difference was not sig-
nificant at the adjusted alpha level, F(1, 88) ¼
6.74, p ¼ .01, h2 ¼ .01, MSE ¼ 689.16.
Depressive realism effects are usually evidenced
by nondepressed people’s judgements being higher
than depressed people’s judgements. This was not
evident in short-ITI conditions, as both mood
groups made similar judgements when the contin-
gency was zero, F(1, 88) ¼ 1.63, p ¼ .21, h2 ¼
.003, MSE ¼ 689.16, and when it was positive,
F(1, 88) ¼ 1.36, p ¼ .25, h2 ¼ .003, MSE ¼
689.16. However, in contrast, when the ITI was
long nondepressed people’s judgements were
higher than depressed people’s judgements at
both zero, F(1, 88) ¼ 10.11, p ¼ .002, h2 ¼ .02,
MSE ¼ 689.16, and positive levels of contingency,
F(1, 88) ¼ 15.66, p ¼ .0002, h2 ¼ .03, MSE ¼
689.16. This result replicates previous findings
involving long ITIs and depressive realism in
zero contingencies and extends them to positive
contingencies. It is worth noting that the basic
difference between long and short ITI conditions
for the nondepressed approached the unadjusted
Figure 3. Mean judgements of control for the response and the
context in zero and positive contingencies with short and long
intertrial intervals as a function of mood from Experiment
2. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.Q3
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level of significance, F(1, 88)¼ 3.51, p, .06, h2¼
.001, MSE ¼ 689.16. It is also worth noting that
an effect size calculated for this comparison using
the standardized difference between the means
(Hedges’s g) was 0.79, which is generally con-
sidered to be a large effect size. Given this and
that we have found this result several times,
there is some confidence in accepting this result.
Response rates. The likelihood of participants eli-
citing a response for all experimental conditions
is shown in Table 3.
An analysis of these scores showed that the only
factor to affect the P(R) was contingency, with
zero contingencies generally producing a higher
probability of response (M ¼ .550, SE ¼ .015)
than positive contingencies (M ¼ .496, SE ¼
.011), F(1, 88) ¼ 8.37, p ¼ .005, h2 ¼ .00, MSE
¼ .008. None of the other main effects or inter-
actions were reliable (all ps . .11, all h2 , .03).
The results of the present experiment provide
support for the hypothesis that ITI effects would
be less evident in positive-contingency conditions,
although there was no evidence that the context
cue elicited differential judgements. Consistent
with predictions of the PPC model, the specific
positive-contingency condition used in this exper-
iment produced no evidence of increases in nonde-
pressed people’s judgements with long ITI
conditions. The data did suggest, however, that
depressive realism effects were present in long
ITI conditions at both zero and positive levels of
contingency. It is also worth pointing out that
the depressed people’s judgements actually
seemed to decrease with longer ITIs. A nonreliable
trend for this difference was also reported by
Msetfi et al. (2005). This result suggests that
depression may be consistent with a decrease in
judgements with long ITIs. This finding and its
implications are discussed further in the General
Discussion.
EXPERIMENT 3
The results of Experiment 2 were consistent with
the RWM and Power PC model predictions for
a weaker effect in positive contingencies. No
reliable difference was found for the nondepressed
group between long and short ITI conditions. Of
course this inference requires acceptance of the
null hypothesis, although in the same experiment
the ITI effect was found with zero contingencies.
Recall, however, that both models predict that
ITI effects should be evident in negative contin-
gencies. We test for evidence of the ITI effect
with a negative-contingency condition in
Experiment 3. Some previous depressive realism
studies have examined judgements of negative
contingencies and found no mood differences
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Kapci & Cramer,
1999; Lennox et al., 1990). However, these
studies all used unidirectional 0 to 100 scales.
That is, both positive and negative relationships
were to be translated to a positive scale. This
type of scale includes both the negative (“I
prevent the outcome.”) and positive (“I produce
the outcome.”) aspects in the “to what extent do
I control the occurrence of the outcome” judge-
ments. So nonzero judgements would indicate
some degree of control whether positive or nega-
tive. The use of this scale mitigated against
finding mood contingency interactions. The fol-
lowing experiment used a bidirectional scale in
order to allow negative judgements.
Method
Participants
A total of 48 university students were recruited for
this experiment using the same mass screening
Table 3. Probability of response for each of the conditions in
Experiment 2
Mood
Contingency ITI length Nondepressed Depressed
Zero Short .529 (.015) .585 (.046)
Long .527 (.028) .558 (.021)
Positive Short .508 (.007) .494 (.021)
Long .500 (.009) .483 (.037)
Note: ITI ¼ intertrial interval. Standard errors of the mean are
shown in parentheses.
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procedure as that described in the previous exper-
iment and were paid £5 for their participation.
Depressed participants scored significantly higher
(M ¼ 16.50, SE ¼ 1.12) on the BDI than did
their nondepressed counterparts (M ¼ 4.13, SE
¼ 0.61), F(1, 45) ¼ 94.74, p , .001.
Experimental conditions (n ¼ 12) were also
matched on a range of demographic variables,
including sex, age, years of education, and
National Adult Reading Test scores (all Fs ,
1.6). However, nondepressed participants had
higher digit span scores (M ¼ 7.21, SE ¼ 0.25)
than did depressed participants (M ¼ 6.52, SE ¼
0.22), F(1, 45) ¼ 4.32, p , .05.Q4
Design
The experiment was a fully factorial 2 (mood:
depressed, nondepressed)  2 (ITI length: short,
0.5 s, long, 15 s)  2 (sex: male, female) fully fac-
torial between-subjects design. The same judge-
ment task as that used in Experiment 2 was
employed in the present experiment. In this task,
the contingency between the response (pressing
Button A) and the outcome (light onset) was pro-
grammed to be negative. The P(OjR) was .5, and
the P(OjNoR) was 1.0, and therefore the pro-
grammed Dp in all conditions was a high
outcome density, moderately negative contingency
(See Figure 1, right column). The contingency
judgements reported in the previous experiments
were all made using a unidirectional, 0 to 100 jud-
gement scale (where 0 represented “no control”,
and 100 indicated “total control”). A bidirectional
scale, ranging from 2 100 (total preventative
control) through 0 (no control) to þ 100 (total
causative control), was used in this experiment.
The change in judgement scale also required a
change in the instructions to introduce the idea
that pressing the button might prevent light
onset from occurring.
Data analysis. The data were analysed using a
similar procedure as that described in the previous
experiment. None of the main effects or inter-
actions involving sex approached the level of sig-
nificance (all ps . .2, all h2 , .08), so this factor
was removed from the model. It might considered
desirable to enter any nonmatched variable into
the analysis as a covariate, although see Miller
and Chapman (2001) for an opposing view.
However, 1 participant did not complete the
digit span test, and including digit span as a covari-
ate would have entailed excluding this participant’s
data from the analysis. All analyses were con-
ducted both including and excluding the covariate.
Digit span had no significant effects on judge-
ments (F , 1), and excluding the covariate made
no difference to the subsequently reported
effects. In order to preserve the equal numbers of
participants in each experimental group (n ¼ 12),
digit span was not included in the reported data
analysis.
Procedure
The instructions only differed from those used in
Experiment 2 in that they included reference to
the possibility that the response could actually
prevent the occurrence of the outcome (see
Appendix C).
Results and discussion
The judgements of response and context from
Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 4. It seems
that, as with Experiment 2, the experimental
manipulation did not influence judgements of
the context cue but appeared to have a strong
interactive effect on the response judgements.
The data were analysed using an MANOVA,
where mood (depressed, nondepressed) and ITI
length (short, long) were between-subjects
factors, and judgements of the response and the
discrete context were the two dependent variables.
There were no reliable main effects or interactions
involving the context cue (Fs , 1).
However, for the response cue, the interaction
between mood and ITI length suggested that the
mood groups responded differently to the ITI
manipulation, F(1, 44) ¼ 10.45, p ¼ .002, h2 ¼
.19, MSE ¼ 1,088.47. None of the main effects
reached the level of significance (Fs , 1).
Further comparisons showed that, as expected,
nondepressed participants’ judgements increased
significantly from very negative in short-ITI
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conditions to a level close to zero in long-ITI con-
ditions, F(1, 44)¼ 8.24, p¼ .006, h2¼ .11, MSE
¼ 1,088.47. Depressed people’s judgements were
significantly more negative in long-ITI conditions
than were nondepressed people’s judgements, F(1,
44) ¼ 4.00, p ¼ .05, h2 ¼ .05, MSE ¼ 1,088.47.
This showed that although depressed people’s jud-
gements did not change as a function of ITI
length, F(1, 44) ¼ 2.89, p ¼ .10, h2 ¼ .03, MSE
¼ 1,088.47, they were unexpectedly higher than
nondepressed people’s judgements in short-ITI
conditions, F(1, 44) ¼ 6.62, p ¼ .014, h2 ¼ .09,
MSE ¼ 1,088.47.
Response rates. The probabilities of response for
each experimental condition are shown in
Table 4. The analysis showed that none of the
main effects or interactions approached the level
of significance (all ps . .22, all h2 , .03).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three experiments, the relationship between
mood, ITI length, and the strength of contingency
judgements was examined. The findings support
the idea that nondepressed peoples’ judgements
are influenced by ITI in a manner consistent
with contingency theory, but that depressed
people’s judgements are not. The implications of
these findings for models of contingency learning
and for depressive realism are discussed in turn.
Contingency learning
The results of our previous work on depressive
realism (Msetfi et al., 2005; Murphy et al., 2005)
suggested that longer periods of intertrial interval
during learning increase contingency estimates of
high-density zero contingencies but did not
exclude the possibility that this effect was due to
the increase in overall procedure time that accom-
panies the longer ITI conditions. However,
Experiment 1 showed that judgements increased
with longer ITIs specifically but did not increase
with longer procedure times.
The results of all three experiments also support
the general prediction that the ITI effects found
with nondepressed participants depended upon
the specific contingency tested rather than the dis-
tinction between zero and nonzero contingencies
made by Alloy and Abramson (1979). As further
evidence, the order of effect sizes is consistent
with the idea that the effect might be strongest
with the negative contingencies we tested and
gradually weaker with the zero and positive con-
tingencies. Effect sizes (ES) for each relevant com-
parison, with nondepressed participants, were
calculated using Hedges’s g (Hedges, 1982), an
unbiased estimator of Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1977),
which is scale independent.1 The ITI effect pro-
duced a large ES in negative-contingency con-
ditions (Experiment 3: g ¼ 1.22), a medium to
large effect in zero contingencies (Experiment 1:
Table 4. Probability of response for all conditions in Experiment 3
Mood
ITI length Non depressed Depressed
Short .535 (.014) .554 (.014)
Long .540 (.016) .525 (.010)
Note. ITI ¼ intertrial interval. Standard errors of the mean are
shown in parentheses.
Figure 4. Judgements of the response and the discrete context’s
control over the outcome in a high-density negative-contingency
condition, as a function of mood and intertrial interval length
from Experiment 3. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean.
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g ¼ 0.84; Experiment 2: g ¼ 0.79) and no percep-
tible effect when the contingency was positive
(Experiment 2: g ¼ 0.09).
One associative model that has been applied to
human contingency learning, the Rescorla–
Wagner model, also predicts this ordinal pattern
when ITIs are included as nonreinforced context
experience. It should be noted that this prediction
was based on the particular set of contingencies
that we tested and is partially determined by the
exact set of cell frequencies. Figure 5 shows that
for any contingency, the increase in Dp, due to
increased frequency of cell D events, is positively
correlated with the frequency of outcomes. It was
for this reason that we argued previously that the
inclusion of ITIs into contingency judgements
might be also responsible for outcome density
effects and showed that outcome density effects
were only present in long-ITI conditions
(Experiment 2: Msetfi et al., 2005). However, if
outcome frequency is held constant, whether
low, medium, or high, the ordinal pattern of ITI
effects should hold. However, it is unlikely that
low outcome frequency conditions would
produce perceptible ITI effects in any contingency
given that the maximum difference in Dp is pre-
dicted to be small.
We also sought to examine whether judge-
ments of a constantly present cue, intended to rep-
resent the context, would be influenced by the
change in the ITI. During long ITI periods in
the absence of the outcome, the context might
be predicted to extinguish (i.e., lose association
with the outcome). However, contextual learning,
as measured by judgements of the button that was
always on, was not influenced by any of the exper-
imental manipulations, including contingency and
ITI length. This could be taken to indicate that
ITI effects do not occur due to context extinction
as some associative models suggest (e.g., RWM).
Alternatively, a more cautious conclusion given
other evidence that judgements of a constantly
present cue do change as a function of contingency
(Vallee-Tourangeau et al., 1998b), might be that
the constantly present cue, used in these exper-
iments, was ineffective. The context button may
have simply been disregarded. Alternatively, the
context judgements may have been contaminated
by the target judgements. The lack of counterba-
lancing during the collection of judgements
leaves this a possibility.
The Power PC model of causal judgements
(Cheng, 1997) also predicts the pattern of ITI
effects that we have observed, if longer ITIs
increase the frequency of cell D events, as seems
to be the case. Figure 1 shows how extra cell D
events differentially influence power in negative,
zero, and positive contingencies. Although ITIs
might be predicted to influence causal power to a
greater extent in negative than in positive contin-
gencies, no effect was predicted in the specific
positive-contingency condition that we tested,
where the P(OjR) was 1.0, and the P(OjNoR)
was .5. This is because generative causal power
is: Dp/[1– P(OjNoR)], which is: .5/ (1 – .5) ¼
1. In this condition, Dp is also calculated by sub-
tracting the P(OjNoR) from 1.0, which is: 1 –
.5 ¼ .5. Therefore the numerator and the denomi-
nator of the generative power would always be
identical, (1 – .5)/(1 – .5) ¼ 1, no matter how
the P(OjNoR) changes. Therefore the pattern of
ITI effects observed here are entirely consistent
with the Power PC model.
Depressive realism
Depressed people have previously been considered
to be more “realistic” in their judgements of con-
tingency (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).
Furthermore depressive realism effects were only
1 Effect sizes like Cohen’s d and Hedges’s g are based on the standardized difference between the sample means. (Hedges’s g is
preferred because it uses a pooled within-sample estimate of the population standard deviation, rather than simply the control group
standard deviation.) One advantage of this method is that the effect size is expressed in standard deviation units, is easily interpret-
able, and is subject to the effect size conventions given by Cohen (small ffi 0.2; medium ffi 0.5; large ffi 0.8). Like all effect sizes, the
size of Hedges’s g is not determined by the scale of the dependent variable and is useful as a tool for comparing effects across exper-
iments, including those with different sample sizes.
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Figure 5. Contingency tables showing how changes in Dp, occurring when intertrial intervals are integrated into the contingency calculation
as cell D events, are dependent upon contingency and the frequency of outcome occurrence f(O). The left panels show traditional Dp calculation,
and the right panels show the same calculation with 40 extra cell D events included in each condition.
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thought to occur in zero contingencies (Alloy
et al., 1985; Lennox et al., 1990; Vasquez, 1987),
due to depressed people’s negative but accurate
expectations. We found that depressed people
made lower judgements than did nondepressed
people in all contingencies tested, but only when
ITIs were long. This did not seem to be indicative
of a general tendency towards accuracy on the part
of depressed people. Irrespective of ITI length,
there was little difference between depressed
people’s judgements of zero and positive
contingencies.
We have also suggested that if nondepressed
people include long periods of context exposure
occurring during the ITI into their judgements,
then perhaps depressed people process these time
periods differently and maybe do not include
ITIs in their judgements. The current results
support the softer claim since there is some evi-
dence that ITI length does influence depressed
people’s judgements. We previously found that
when a short ITI was of a relatively standard 3-s
duration, and the long ITI was of a 15-s duration,
there was no evidence of an ITI effect (e.g., Msetfi
et al., 2005, Exp. 1; Experiment 1 here). However,
when the short ITI was of a .5-s duration, as in
Experiments 2 and 3 reported here, there was
some evidence of a reduction on judgements
with longer ITIs (see Figure 3). In fact, in the
negative contingency (DP ¼ 2.5), depressed
people’s judgements with the short .5-s ITI were
high and close to zero. This is more consistent
with the suggestion that depressed people
process ITIs differently, but it would not be true
to say that their judgements are not influenced
by ITI length. In fact the pattern of findings
seems to suggest that the effect of the ITI in
depressed people is exactly in opposition to the
same effect in nondepressed people. Longer inter-
trial intervals increase judgements of zero and
negative contingencies in nondepressed people
but have the opposite effect in depressed people.
The study of zero and positive contingencies
has always been seen as particularly relevant for
depression. In this study we also tested for depress-
ive realism effects in negative contingencies, which
might also have some particular relevance to
depression, because these are conditions in which
actions reduce the likelihood of an outcome. The
statement, “When I am around, nothing good
ever happens”, is a statement typical of a depressed
person and an instance in which a person believes
that their behaviour or presence reduces the likeli-
hood of outcomes. This type of statement implies
that depressed people often feel, to some degree,
responsible for the nonoccurrence of positive out-
comes. However, the latter situation is essentially a
perceived negative contingency. Along these lines,
in the negative contingency experiment reported
here, the ability to control light onset, in the fic-
tional situation of needing to use experimental
equipment, might have been seen as a desirable
state of affairs or a positive outcome. When there
was information available that might have discon-
firmed the presence of a preventative relationship
(the long ITI or cell D), depressed people were
strongly convinced that they were preventing the
outcome from occurring. In the field of clinical psy-
chology, this type of negativity is often taken as evi-
dence for the existence of negative depressive
schema postulated by cognitive theories of
depression (e.g., Beck, 1967). Such schema are
negative fundamental beliefs about the self, includ-
ing themes of helplessness and inefficacy, and bias
the selection, coding, storage, and retrieval of
incoming information (Clark, Beck, & Alford,
1999). However, the present results suggest that a
depressive tendency to underestimate the frequency
of events that essentially disconfirm the presence of
a preventative relationship between response and
outcome (or confirm the presence of a positive
relationship) could explain continued depressive
negativity in some situations without recourse to
schema-based theory (e.g., Beck, 1967), as is tra-
ditionally the case.
In summary, this research has illustrated the
difficulty in drawing conclusions about the relative
accuracy of contingency judgements on the basis of
procedures involving normative measures such as
Dp. Nondepressed people’s judgements change
systematically with ITI length in a manner con-
sistent with these time periods being included
into the contingency calculation as cell D events.
Given that their judgements could be considered
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to be more consistent with causal power calculated
using the “overall Dp” as opposed to the “within
trial” programmed Dp, nondepressed people were
accurate. However, there was no evidence that
the depressed were more accurate in their judge-
ments, as there was little evidence of the ability
to discriminate between two different levels of
contingency. Thus perhaps depressive realism
effects might be more accurately described as
mood effects on learning.
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APPENDIX A
Instructions and question wording for the contingency tasks used in Experiment 1
Screen 1
Imagine the following scenario.
You are a scientist and you are setting up the apparatus for your latest experiment. The apparatus includes a light bulb wired up to
a light switch button and has its own power supply.
It is very important for your experiment that you the scientist feel that you can control when the light is switched on or remains
off. You are working on a tight budget and had to use an old power supply provided by another researcher. You are slightly worried
that the power supply you’ve had to use may not be suitable for this purpose.
Therefore you want to test the apparatus to assess how much control you have over the light switching on.
Screen 2
At the beginning of the test you will see a light bulb on the screen. There will be a short delay and then the button will appear on the screen
too. While the button is on the screen you will be able to press it and see whether the light switches on or remains off.
You can press the light button using the space bar on the computer keyboard. If the light switches on, it will stay on for 2 seconds
before switching off.
The button will then disappear from the screen and will re-appear again when you can press the button again. In the test there will
be many opportunities to press the button and see what happens.
Screen 3
In order to judge how much control your button pressing has over whether the light comes on, you need to know what happens
when you press the button. IT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT that you know what happens when you do not press the button.
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So, on about half of the button pressing opportunities, you should sit back and see what happens when you don’t press the
button.
Screen 4
(Graphic shows light bulb) If you press the button below, you will see an example of the light coming on. When you have done that,
press the carry on button to proceed.
Screen 5
At the end of the test, you will be asked to make a judgement about how much control your pressing the button had over whether
the light came on.
“Total control” means that the light switching on is completely determined by your choice of response—either pressing or not
pressing the button.
“No control” means that you have found that your button pressing has no influence at all on whether the light is switched on or
not. In other words the light switching on has nothing to do with what you did or didn’t do.
“Partial control” means that your pressing or not pressing the button, does influence the light switching on, but not completely. In
other words, whether you press or don’t press the button matters to some extent, but not totally.
Judgement screen
We would now like you to make a judgement about how much control your pressing the button had over whether the light came on.
We will ask you to make this judgement by moving the slider.
If you consider that your button press has total control over the light coming on, you would move the slider to the “total control”
end.
If you consider that your button press has absolutely no control over light coming on, you would move the slider to the “no
control” end.
It may be that you consider that your button pressing has only partial control over the light coming on, then you would move the
slider’s position accordingly. Putting it nearer to the “total control” end means MORE control—while putting it nearer to the “no
control” end means LESS control.
APPENDIX B
Instructions and question wording used for the contingency task used in Experiment 2.
Screen 1
Please imagine the following scenario.
You are a scientist and you are investigating some old equipment in the store cupboard in the lab. You find a piece of apparatus
called a PERCEPTOMETER. It resembles a large box with a light bulb attached to it. The box has 2 switches on it—“button A”
and “button B” which you assume controls the light switching on, but you are not sure exactly how it works.
You think that the PERCEPTOMETER might be useful for your latest experiment. However because of the nature of your
experiment, you need to be sure that you can control when the light switches on quite precisely. If the PERCEPTOMETER is
slightly unreliable, it will ruin your experiment!
Click here to see a picture of the PERCEPTOMETER.
Screen 2
Therefore you must test the PERCEPTOMETER to decide, “How much CONTROL DO YOU HAVE over the light switch-
ing on.” It is possible that you may not have TOTAL control or ZERO control over the light switching on, but some intermediate
level of control—slightly more or slightly less.
There is one problem however. “Button B” is ALWAYS stuck in the “ON” position. So you can only test how much control you
have over the light switching on, by pressing “Button A”.
Test your control over the light switching on by pressing “Button A”.
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In order to do the test you must press “Button A” lots of times to see what happens. You must also see what happens when you
DON’T press “Button A”. This is because if the light switches on lots of times when you don’t press “Button A”, you have less
control over the light switching on. At the end of the test, you will be asked to make a judgement about how much control your
pressing of “Button A” had over the light switching on.
How much control does “Button B”—not you—have over the light switching on.
Remember that “Button B” will be always stuck in the “ON” position. It might be that “Button B” has more, less or the same control,
over the light switching on, as you do! Therefore when you have done the test, you will not only be asked about how much control you
have over the light switching on, you will also be asked, “How much control does “Button B” have over the light switching on”.
Screen 3
When the test starts, you will see a picture of a light bulb and 2 buttons—button A and button B. When a button is pressed, its
onscreen picture is shaded with a darker colour. You will see that Button B is permanently in the “on” position.
You are only allowed to test button A during specific button pressing opportunities. When you are allowed to press button A, a
message will appear on the screen saying, “You can press button A now!” This message will appear on the screen for 3 seconds
during which time you can press button A once, by pressing the “space-bar” on the keyboard. Once you have pressed button
A, it will be shaded dark, to show that you have pressed it. At the end of the 3 second interval, the light will either switch on




In order to gauge how much control YOUR pressing of “Button A” has over the light switching on, it is very IMPORTANT,
that on some button pressing opportunities you press “Button A”. However, it is also important that on approximately half the poss-
ible occasions, you DO NOT press “Button A”. This is so that you can see what happens when you do not press “Button A”.
Therefore, on about half of the button pressing opportunities, DO NOT press “Button A”.
Screen 5
At the end of the test, you will be asked to make a judgement—using a slider like this—about how much control YOUR PRESSING
“Button A” had over whether the light came on.
(PICTURE OF SLIDER LABELLED NO CONTROL—PARTIAL CONTROL—TOTAL CONTROL—divided into units
of 1 from 0 to 100)
“Total control” means that the light switching on is completely determined by your choice of response—either pressing or not press-
ing “Button A”.
“No control” means that you have found that your pressing of “Button A” pressing has no influence at all on whether the light is
switched on or not. In other words the light switching on has nothing to do with what you did or didn’t do.
Partial control means that your pressing or not pressing “Button A”, does influence the light switching on, but not completely. In
other words, whether you press or don’t press “Button A” matters to some extent, but not totally.
You will also be asked to make a similar judgement about how much control “Button B”—not you—has over the light switching on.
If you are ready, please tell the experimenter.
Button A Judgement Screen
We would now like you to make a judgement about how much control YOUR pressing of “Button A” had over whether the light
came on. We will ask you to make this judgement by moving the slider.
If you consider that your button press has total control over the light coming on, you would move the slider to the “total control”
end.
If you consider that your button press has absolutely no control over the light coming on, you would move the slider to the “no
control” end.
It may be that you consider that your button pressing has only partial control over the light coming on, then you would move the
slider’s position accordingly. Putting it nearer to the “total control” end means MORE control—while putting it nearer to the “no
control” end means LESS control.
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Button B Judgement Screen
Remember, “Button B” was always on during the test.
“Button B” might have more, less or the same control over the light switching on, than your pressing of “Button A”. How much
control do you think that “Button B” had over the light coming on?
Give your judgement on the slider below.
APPENDIX C Q6
Changes to the instructions in Experiment 3
Screen 5
At the end of the test, you will be asked to make a judgement—using a slider like this—about how much control your pressing of
“Button A” had over whether the light came on or not.
“Total causal control” means that your pressing of “Button A” caused the light to switch on.
“No control” means that you have found that your pressing of “Button A” pressing has no influence at all on whether the light
switched on or not.
“Total preventive control” means that your pressing of “Button A”, seems to prevent the light from switching on.
Or you could move the slider to somewhere in between, because you might think that your pressing of “button A” causes the light
to switch on to some degree, but not totally; or that your pressing of “button A” prevents the light from switching on, but not totally.
You will also be asked to make a judgement about how much control “Button B” alone—not you—had over the light switching
on. If you are ready, please tell the experimenter.
NB: The questions asked in Experiment 3 were similar to those shown in Appendix 1 but used the bidirectional rating scale.






Q2 Figure 1: On actual figure, slash in probability expression should be vertical.
Q3 Figure 3: “Note: ND ¼ nondepressed, D ¼ depressed.” deleted, because abbreviations do not
appear in figure.
Q4 Change in punctuation OK, or was the end of the sentence missing?
Q5 Murphy, Vallee Tourangeau, Msetfi, & Baker (2005). Publisher location? Ltd if UK, Inc if US.
Q6 Was Appendix 2 again. Appendix C ok?
PQ1 Publisher query
Allan, L. G., Siegel, S., & Hannah, S. (2007). Page range?
